The kiosks themselves were ground into plastic pellets. But the funding term sheets—the liquidation preferences, the ratchets, the vendor notes—remain, preserved in SEC filings, a quiet monument to the last time anyone thought renting a disc from a parking lot was a winning bet.
“We didn’t know what venture capital was,” Mark Phillips told a local business journal in 2007. “We just knew that Blockbuster had late fees, and people hated them.” dvdplay funding
In January 2012, DVDPlay filed for Chapter 7 liquidation. Total capital raised across all rounds and debt: . Total recovered for secured creditors: $3.1 million (mostly from selling kiosks for scrap metal and disc inventory to a liquidator in Texas). Unsecured creditors, including the Oregon drivers who had been paid in stock options, received nothing. Epilogue: What the Funding Bought (and What It Didn’t) The DVDPlay story is a textbook case of misaligned funding cycles . They raised equity when they needed debt, debt when they needed a strategic partner, and a growth round when they needed an exit. The kiosks themselves were ground into plastic pellets
No round occurred.
DVDPlay’s story is not one of technology or consumer habit. It is a story of —of desperate rounds, convertible notes, and the brutal math that happens when you try to out-spend a giant selling dollar bills for ninety cents. This is the anatomy of a capital war. Act I: The Bootstrap Years (2002–2005) Long before the kiosk wars, DVDPlay was the side project of Mark and Sharon Phillips, two serial entrepreneurs who had made a small fortune in the Oregon wine distribution business. Their first machine—a clunky, beige box that held 300 discs and required a customer to swipe a credit card and manually return the DVD to a slot—was funded with $80,000 of their own savings. “We just knew that Blockbuster had late fees,
In the annals of forgotten tech, few artifacts feel as abruptly obsolete as the DVD rental kiosk. But in 2005, as Netflix was still a mail-order service and streaming was a buffering punchline, the battle for the $7 billion home-video market moved to the parking lots of America. Two names emerged: Redbox, backed by the deep pockets of Coinstar and McDonald’s, and DVDPlay, a plucky, privately held competitor from Portland, Oregon.
The funding had bought growth, but not profitability. By 2008, the financial crisis was freezing VC wallets. Redbox, backed by McDonald’s real estate and Coinstar’s cash flow, dropped rental prices to $0.50 for a limited time. DVDPlay’s average revenue per kiosk fell from $1,100/month to $600/month.