Key - Half Life 1.1

Key Half-Life 1.1 forces a hard question: How much trust can you put in a secret that is slowly bleeding? The answer is uncomfortable. You stop treating keys as eternal truths and start treating them as short-lived credentials. You implement automatic rotation not as a quarterly chore, but as a continuous background process. You build systems where a key compromised after its half-life is irrelevant—because it has already been replaced.

So when you generate that new RSA-4096 or Ed25519 key, do not ask "How long will this last?" Ask: "What is its half-life under load?" And if the answer is less than the life of your session, you are finally building for the world as it is—not as 1.0 wished it to be. key half life 1.1

[ P(t) = 2^{-t/T} ]

[ P(t, u) = 2^{-t/T} \cdot (1 - e^{-\lambda u}) ] Key Half-Life 1

This is the quiet revolution of 1.1: moving from static security to kinetic security . The half-life is not a warning. It is a design parameter. You implement automatic rotation not as a quarterly

The formula is no longer: